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RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law: Unfair Labor Practice Strikes During
Taft-Hartley Act "Cooling-Off' Period
Employees were discharged after engaging in a strike directed solely against
employer unfair labor practices. Employer refused reinstatement on the grounds:
(1) that the strike was in violation of a no-strike clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreement; and, (2) that the strikers lost their employee status under
section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U. S. C. §158(d)
(1952), because the strike occurred during the sixty-day "cooling off" period
required by that section. In a proceeding for enforcement of a NLRB order di-
recting reinstatement of these employees, held (6-3): neither the no-strike clause
of the agreement nor the loss of status provision of the statute is applicable to
strikes solely against employer unfair labor practices, and the NLRB had power
to order reinstatement. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S. 270 (1956).
The Court was unanimous in construing the no-strike clause as applicable
only to economic strikes, since the agreement, taken as a whole, dealt solely
with the economic relationship between employer and employee. They refused
to find that the employees had given up their most effective weapon against
employer interference with their rights, without clear and compelling language
in the agreement to support such an interpretation.
Even if a breach of contract had been found, a like result could have been
reached by application of the principle that a strike in breach of contract is not
grounds for employer's refusal to reinstate where the employer's actions causing
the strike were inconsistent with the purpose of the contract. United Biscuit Co.,
38 N. L. R. B. 778 (1942), enforcement granted, 128 F. 2d 771 (7th Cir. 1942).
However, the Court's view appears preferable as precedent for interpretation
of such strike waiver agreements. While no-strike agreements covering economic
conditions are valuable implements of peaceful labor settlements, unions can
hardly be expected to give up the strike weapon as a counter-measure to em-
ployer unfair practices, without exacting comparable employer concessions.
Hence, a strict interpretation of such agreements will encourage their continued
use. The view adopted by the Court supports current NLRB policy.
Although the legal right to strike is traced back to the early case of Com-
monwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111 (Mass. 1842), the concomitant right of employ-
ees to waive their strike right by proper bargaining agreements has never been
questioned. This is so because of the public policy favoring peaceful settlement
of labor disputes. In furtherance of this policy, the NLRB formulated the doc-
trine that strikes in breach of such agreements are not protected activity under
the NLRA. Joseph Dyson & Sons Inc., 72 N. L. R. B. 445 (1947); Scullin
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Steel Co., 65 N. L. R. B. 1294 (1946). These two cases involved economic
strikes and contained dicta to the effect that the doctrine was not applicable to
unfair labor practice strikes. Joseph Dyson & Sons Inc., supra at 447; Scullin
Steel Co., supra at 1318. However, the Board subsequently applied the same rule
to an unfair labor practice strike. National Electric Products Corp., 80 N. L. R. B.
995 (1948). At the Board's hearing of the instant case, the National Electric
Products Corp. case was distinguished on its facts. Mastro Plastics Corp., 103
N. L. K B. 511, 514 (1951). Hence, this ruling of the Board represents a re-
treat from its previous holding, by a refusal to apply a strike waiver agreement
to unfair, labor practice strikes where such strikes are not clearly included in
the agreement. A similar result was reached in Wagner Iron Works, 104
N. L. R. B. 445 (1953), enforcement granted, 220 F. 2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955).
Section 8(d) of the NLRA, as amended, defines the duty to bargain col-
lectively, which is imposed upon both the employer and employee by section
8(a) and (b). The section requires that a party desiring termination or modifi-
cation of an existing agreement must serve written notice upon the other party
sixty days prior to the expiration of the agreement. During this sixty-day period,
all terms and conditions of the existing agreement must be continued in full
force and effect without resort to strike or lockout, and any employee who en-
gages in a strike within the specified period loses his employee status under the
act.
The majority of the Court took the view that section 8(d) was designed
primarily to prevent economic warfare during the renegogiation period; hence,
the loss of status provision was construed as not applicable to strikes against
employer unfair labor practices because such strikes are not directed toward ter-
mination or modification of the contract. The dissent argued that the loss of
status provision would have no effect unless applied to strikes against employer
unfair practices.
Apart from this section, the courts, in assessing the rights of strikers to
reinstatement, have dearly distinguished between economic strikers and unfair
labor practice strikers. Although economic strikers are not entitled to reinstate-
ment where permanent replacements for them have been secured, NLRB v.
Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333 (1938), unfair labor practice
strikers have an absolute right to reinstatement upon their unconditional appli-
cation, despite replacement. NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F. 2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951). Even
where the strike was economic in its inception, but was converted to an unfair
practice strike by employer's conduct during the strike, employees replaced after
-the employer's wrongful conduct are entitled to reinstatement. NLRB v. Rem-
ington Rand, 130 F. 2d 919 (2d Cir. 1942). Where unfair labor practice strik-
ers have been guilty of wrongful conduct during the strike, it is within the
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NLRB's discretion to order reinstatement. NLRB v. Elkland Leather Co., 114 F.
2d 221" (3d Cir. 1940). Hence, the majority is not without precedent in dis-
tinguishing between the two types of strikers.
The dissent's argument proceeds on the grounds that union violations of
section 8(d) are unprotected by the act even without the loss of status pro-
vision because they are union unfair practices under section 8(b); therefore, the
employer could punish such activity, with impunity, except where the employer
was also guilty of unfair practices which induced the strike. In the latter case,
apart from the loss of status provision, the Board could order reinstatement in its
discretion because the antecedent employer unfair practices gave the employees
rights under section 8(a). See NLRB v. Elkland Leather Co., supra. But the loss
of status provision would prevent the Board's exercise of its discretion in this
case because the striking employees would lose their rights under section 8(a).
Hence, the loss of status provision would be of no force or effect unless applied
to unfair labor practice strikers.
Neither view gains any conclusive support from the legislative, history. The
dissent finds support in the interpretation given to the provision by the oppon-
ents of the Taft-Hartley Act who pointed out the inequity of such a result in op-
posing it. S. REP. No. 105 (Minority), 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1947). Al-
though the sponsors of the bill never squarely met the minority's objection, Sen-
ator Ball, one of the conferrees on the bill, emphasized in debate that the section
prohibited "quickie strikes" intended to secure economic advantage. 93 CONG.
REC. 5014 (1947). It is a general rule of statutory construction that the views
of the sponsors must be looked to for the meaning of doubtful.words. Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951).
1
The dissent appears to place undue reliance upon the rule of construction
that effect and significance must be accorded to every part of a statute. Wash-
ington Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112 (1879). In applying the rule they
argued that the loss of status provision adds nothing to the law regarding eco-
nomic strikes. But since economic strikes would be the real evil as far as dis-
rupting negotiations is concerned, it seems not unreasonable to conclude that the
provision was not meant to add anything to the law. Justice Holmes long ago
pointed out that there is no canon against the legislature making explicit what
is already implied in a statute. United States v. Sischo, 262 U. S. 165, 169 (1923).
To accept the dissent's interpretation is to impose undue discrimination
upon workers employed under collective bargaining agreements. Not only are
they placed in a disparate position with regard to the employer, but they are
in a worse position than if they had no bargaining agreement. The employer
could engage in any type of unfair activity, during the "cooling off" period, sub-
ject only to a "cease and desist" order of the NLRB under the act's slow re-
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medial processes; whereas, any employee who engaged in self-help against such
conduct would be subject to summary dismissal irrespective of the employer's
conduct. Furthermore, the employees would lose their right to strike against
unfair practices during the critical contract renegotiation period when the strength
of their bargaining agent is most important, even though they admittedly have
such right prior to the sixty-day period, and at any time if they are not covered
by a collective agreement. Thus the union, by bargaining at all, is precluded
from protecting its very existence during the bargaining period.
Conceding that the Eightieth Congress had set a high value on peaceful
settlement of labor disputes, it does not necessarily follow that this enactment
was intended to adopt the extremes that might be enacted in furtherance of
such policy. It appears to the writer that the result reached by the dissent is
incongruous and unreasonable, and the majority view is to be preferred, in light
of the declared legislative policy underlying the NLRA, as amended, namely:
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce... by encouraging the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association ..... 61 STAT. 136 (1947) 29 U. S. C.
§151 (1952).
John Stenger
Labor Law: Federal v. State Jurisdiction To Enjoin Unfair Labor Practices
Appellant union was enjoined by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
from committing unfair labor practices within the Wisconsin Employment Peace
ACT WISCONSIN STAT. c. 111, §§111.04, 111.06, 111.07 (1953). The conduct
subject to the cease and desist order consisted of mass picketing, violence and
overt threats of violence and as such constituted coercion and was therefore within
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 61 STAT. 140-143 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§157,158 (b) (1) (A) (1952). Held (6-3): the state board could
enjoin violent conduct as a valid exercise of its police power. United Automobile
Workers, CIO v. W.E.R.B., 351 U. S. 266 (1956).
While the boundary between exclusive federal jurisdiction and state juris-
diction in the field of labor relations has not been clearly delineated, it cannot be
questioned that rigid restrictions have been impressed upon the jurisdiction of the
states over industrial controversies. A state may not, in furtherance of its labor
policy, enjoin unfair labor practices in areas where the NLRB would accept
jurisdiction. Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953). Nor may a state,
in furtherance of policies not associated with labor, enjoin such conduct as, e.g.,
a restraint of trade. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468 (1955). Yet
